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POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT 
CENTURY'S END. By Gary Minda. New York: New York Univer­
sity Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 350. Cloth, $36; paper, $18.95. 
American legal scholarship of the past thirty years has been 
characterized by nothing so much as fragmentation. The accelerat­
ing evolution of contemporary scholarship has brought about forays 
into all manner of cognate disciplines, has elicited considerable crit­
icism,1 and, for some scholars, has reflected an extreme disaffection 
with traditional techniques of law teaching and analysis.2 This lat­
ter condition has come to be known by some as the "postmodern" 
condition (p. 2). In Postmodern Legal Movements, Gary Minda3 
attempts nothing less than to capture the whole sweep of American 
jurisprudence. In so doing, he purports to explain this postmodern 
condition as it exists in the legal academy.4 
Postmodern Legal Movements does two things. First, the bulk of 
the book provides an overview of American jurisprudence, from 
Christopher Columbus Langdell to the present. This overview is 
necessary because, in order to understand "postmodern forms of 
jurisprudence, we must first explore what came before postmodern­
ism, that is, modernism" (p. 5). Second, the relatively short latter 
portion of the book presents an argument about the current state of 
American legal scholarship and its future. Minda's picture of con­
temporary legal thought is that of a paradigm shift in the making. 
As he explains it: 
1. Judge Edwards, for example, complains that law schools "should be ... producing 
scholarship that judges, legislators, and practitioners can use...• But many law schools ­
especially the so-called 'elite' ones - have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing 
abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy." Harry T. Edwards, 
The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 M:rCH. L. 
REV. 34, 34 (1992). See generally sources cited infra note 22. 
2. 	One scholar recently described this disaffection thus: 
So complete is this marginalization that even a legal theory as peculiar as Ronald 
Dworkin's - a theory that claims, among other things, that there are such entities as 
legal "principles" that are neither positive legal rules nor autonomous moral nonns, and 
that always generate a single correct legal answer in "hard" cases - is treated with a 
symptomatic combination of respectful attention and fundamental indifference by an 
academic discourse whose real interests obviously are elsewhere. 
Paul F. Campos, The Chaotic Pseudotext, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2178, 2180 n.4 (1996). 
3. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. 
4. Postmodernists will already have objected to my use of the term postmodern - for to 
use it to describe a school or a style of scholarship or, indeed, to draw sharp distinctions 
between it and modernism seems to be a hopelessly modernist pursuit. Unfortunately, in 
order to discuss the matter at all, one must use some term as an admittedly simplistic short­
hand for the postmodern phenomenon; otherwise, sensible discussion of the matter is simply 
impossible. Furthermore, it would be difficult to raise this argument in defense of Minda's 
book, for it too is couched in modernist language and argument. See infra section 11.B. 
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[T]he mainstream or modem view has broken into a diverse body of 
jurisprudential theories and perspectives. The current state of law 
and modem jurisprudence has become like a delta just before a river 
empties into the sea. The mighty river that was once modem jurispru­
dence has broken down into separate rivulets as it merges into a 
larger and different body of water. [p. 257] 
Postmodern Legal Movements will prove useful to those in 
search of a basic introduction to the standard account of American 
legal thought.s Minda is well read in jurisprudence, and his book 
provides a comprehensive overview of legal philosophy as it has 
developed in this country during the twentieth century. 
As an argument about the direction of legal thought, however, 
the book suffers from certain problems. It has a strong tendency to 
overgeneralization and is at times ideologically one-sided. Further­
more, the book's more fundamental arguments - about the nature 
of the postmodern phenomenon, its causes, and its future - seem 
unduly conclusory. This book is a lumper, as it were, not a splitter; 
its tendency to compartmentalize intellectual trends seems 
Procrustean and simplistic. 
These criticisms lead to a more general one. Minda is quite 
sympathetic to the postmodern view,6 and yet his book seems 
unduly categorical and rigid - vices, if anything, of modernism (as 
Minda uses the term). Thus, the irony of Postmodern Legal 
Movements is that the book seems itself to be a modernist work. 
This may be no serious criticism in itself,7 but one is left to wonder 
why a scholar so critical of modernist scholarship has taken on such 
a modernist project. 
Part I of this Notice discusses Minda's historical treatment. It 
sets out in abbreviated fashion the story as Minda has told it, in 
order to set the stage for his more central arguments. Part I also 
briefly examines the book's deeper claims and considers Minda's 
view that modem jurisprudence is at a critical point, verging on an 
inexorable tum to postmodernism. Part II takes a more critical 
view, assessing the problems and ironies mentioned above. 
5. Be forewarned, however, that this book is sometimes hard to read. For example: 
"[Legal scholars] continue to practice Langdellian formalism as the rhetoric of the transcen­
dental object or subject in which the legal subject-interpreter is eclipsed, even while they 
strive to be normative." P. 59. Or try this one: "This quasi-scientific perspective presumes 
that lawyers can discover a relatively stable basis for justifying legal results by universalizing 
legal propositions abstracted from hypothetical examples structured by behavioral assump­
tions about economic motivations of homogeneous individuals." Pp. 100-1. 
6. Minda finds postmodernism to be "the basis for satisfaction, hope, and new intellectual 
inquiry" and believes that "the time has come to seriously consider the transformative 
changes now unfolding in American legal thought," because postmodernism has "hasten[ed] 
the death, not of jurisprudence, but of the particular methods that modem legal scholars 
have employed in thinking about their subject[s]." Pp. 256-57. 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53. 
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I. THE THREAD OF LEGAL HISTORY 
A. Early Trends 
Minda first lays out a lengthy exegesis of what he calls "mod­
em" jurisprudence.s He does so because definitions of postmodern­
ism are usually given in relational terms - postmodernism is 
everything that is not modernism.9 Modernism, in turn, seems to be 
basically everything that we have known as jurisprudence until the 
present time; only in the past few decades have we begun to explore 
postmodern modes of legal thought.10 
The first four chapters set out a fairly traditional account of the 
history of American legal philosophy.11 Minda locates the begin­
ning of modem jurisprudence in the 1871 publication of Langdell's 
A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts.12 Langdell is for 
Minda the source of considerable evil in American legal thought ­
he was the father, or at least a chief proponent, of American "for­
malism. "13 The evil of formalism was that it ignored the cultural 
context in which law exists. As later thinkers understood, formal­
8. The following summary of jurisprudential history is taken solely from the book and is 
intended only to reflect the story as Minda has told it. Any criticism will be made in the 
accompanying notes. 
9. See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, The Poverty of Postmodernist Theory, 62 U. Cow. L. REv• 
. 577, 577 (1991). 
10. As Jamieson notes, the relational definition is basically uninformative because legal 
scholars do not agree on what modem means. See id. at 577-78. I will generally follow 
Minda's usage of terms. Note that he uses "modernism" somewhat differently from how it 
has been used elsewhere in philosophy. As Leszek Kolakowski explains, "modem" usually 
refers to the recurrent trend in popular culture to question prevailing orthodoxy. See LESZEK 
KOLAKOWSKI, MODERNITY ON ENDLESS TRIAL 3-13 (1990). While definitions are hazardous 
in this area, I take Minda's use of "postmodern" to mean essentially what Kolakowski means 
by "modem"; by "modem," in tum, I take Minda to mean the generally accepted dogma of 
the time, or at least the dogma of the present time. 
11. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATIERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2 (1995) (summariz­
ing the standard story roughly as laid out by Minda); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding 
Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 
2505, 2507 (1992) (same). 
12. See p. 13 (citing C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON nm LAW OF 
CoNTRAcrs (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1871)). 
13. Formalism holds that the principles underlying law, if properly applied, produce 
"right" answers to legal questions, as if those principles were the major premises of legal 
syllogisms. Pp. 13-14. Minda also uses the term conceptualism to describe Langdell's juris­
prudence. Conceptualism generally is "a form of logic that classifies legal phenomena on the 
basis of a few fundamental abstract principles and concepts developed from the distinct 
methods of legal reasoning." P. 14. Thus, conceptualism is the belief that law is a value-free 
set of principles that exists independently of culture. Pp. 14-15. A good example of 
Langdell's outlook is found in the introduction to his casebook: 
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines...• Moreover, 
the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed .... 
If these doctrines could be so classified and arranged that each should be found in its 
proper place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable from their number. 
LANGDELL, supra note 12, at viii-ix, quoted in Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics: 
The Interpretive Tum in Jurisprudence, 16 lowA L. REv. 661, 661 n.5 (1991). 
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ism allowed the application of rules without respect to the social 
inequities that may have given rise to them - racial, class 
inequality, and so on - or the unfairness that may result from their 
application (pp. 64-65). 
The second major phase of American jurisprudence, which is 
commonly seen as a reaction to the ills of formalism,14 is known as 
realism. Minda identifies the origins of realism in the frustration 
felt by certain faculty at the Columbia and Yale law schools with 
formalistic law and jurisprudence and their "deep skepticism about 
the possibility of decision making according to rule. "15 According 
to Minda, however, most legal realists did not wholly reject formal­
ism. Although the realists recognized the "relationship between 
law and society [that] enabled [them] to argue in favor of 'non­
technical' or 'extra-legal' considerations in legal decision making" 
(p. 28), they "were not that different from the traditional legal 
scholars they criticized" (p. 31). While Langdell had argued that 
"law is a science," the realists "advanced the similar idea that 'law is 
a social science'" (p. 31). Thus, although realism was a rejection of 
the formalist ideal of a discrete set of guiding legal principles, it 
nonetheless maintained the view that "correct" legal answers could 
be discovered through social science methods that properly take 
into account the cultural context in which law operates.16 
Realism, which flourished throughout the 1920s and 1930s and 
lived on into the 1940s, was ultimately defeated by a temporary 
return to formalism. The 1940s saw the birth of several strands of 
thought that ultimately crystallized into what is now known as the 
"legal process" or "neutral principles" school (pp. 33-40). Legal 
process scholars proposed that law could be made objective if deci­
sionmaking were based only on process values rather than on sub­
stantive values. This could be accomplished, they argued, by 
14. See RooER CoITERRELL, THE POLITICS OF JurusPRUDENCE 185-88 (1989). 
15. P. 27. In particular, realists rebelled against the Supreme Court's so-called economic 
due process jurisprudence, as epitomized by the Court's decision in Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905). Pp. 26-27. 
16. Duxbury shares this view. See DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 158-59 (arguing that 
although the realists rallied against Langdellian formalism, they "generally lost their nerve 
when faced with the implications of their own jurisprudential constructions"). For a defense 
of the more traditional view - that realism fully broke with formalism and that, in fact, 
twentieth-century jurisprudence has merely been a "pendulum swing" between realism and 
formalism - see Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes: A Century of 
Nightmares and Noble Dreams, 84 GEo. LJ. 2215, 2222-27 (1996) (reviewing DUXBURY, 
supra note 11). 
As a general matter, Minda seems largely to accept the "pendulum swing" model of juris­
prudential history. Although he shares some doubt that the realists wholly rejected formal­
ism, he nevertheless seems to understand jurisprudence as an ongoing struggle between 
formalism and the rejection of formalism - from Langdell's formalism to the indeterminacy 
claims of the realists to the formalistic rigidity of the legal process scholars (discussed in more 
detail below) to the more skeptical works of the 1960s and 1970s that have led to the 
postmodern condition of today. 
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allowing the courts to consider only those matters within their insti­
tutional competence - disputes involving the individual interests 
of private parties - and requiring that they defer in all other mat­
ters to bodies more competent to resolve them. Thus, awkward 
value choices would be left to the representative legislatures, rather 
than the antimajoritarian courts.17 This, in turn, would allow law to 
be more like the "science" envisioned by Langdell. 
Modernism - all the jurisprudence predating postmodernism, 
including formalism,· realism, and legal process - finally met the 
beginning of its end when courts and commentators began to 
understand the reciprocity of law and society. That is, the first 
seeds of postmodernism were sown when it became clear that law 
and the people who make it and are subject to it are interconnected 
and interdependent. Minda locates this shift in two places. First, he 
cites two scholarly articles written in the early 1960s: Ronald 
Coase's The Problem ofSocial Cost18 and Charles Reich's The New 
Property.19 The "common jurisprudential perspective" of these two 
articles was their "similar critical responses to the role and function 
of law in society .... Both authors implicitly rejected traditional 
faith in the efficaciousness of the legal process and the autonomy of 
fundamental rights" (pp. 72-73). Thus, they both considered it 
important to reject the prevailing formalist view that law may be 
studied profitably in a vacuum, without reference to the cultural 
context surrounding it.20 
17. Pp. 34-35. This view of legal process "winning" temporarily over realism again 
reflects the "pendulum swing" model. See Gordon, supra note 16, at 2222-27. 
18. R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
19. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964). 
20. This statement of the roots of postmodemism may sound suspiciously like legal real­
ism. After all, they both focus on the fact that formalistic doctrine and scholarship obscure 
the cultural and political content of law. Indeed, postmodemism and its most recent antece­
dent, critical legal studies (CLS), are often said to be at least closely analogous to, or even 
simply a rehash of, realism. See J. Stuart Russell, The Critical Legal Studies Challenge to 
Contemporary Mainstream Legal Philosophy, 18 Oi:TAWA L. REv. 1, 5 (1986) (claiming that 
critical legal studies has "a very pronounced ancestral relationship with Legal Realism"); 
A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Iconoclasts and Legal Ideals, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 819, 830-31 (1990) 
(arguing that "iconoclasm" unites skeptical philosophies and that the differences between 
skeptical philosophies are superficial); Discussion: Jurisprudential Responses to Legal 
Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 341, 345 (1988) (comment by Charles Fried) ("The whole 
difficulty which the pseudo-philosophy of critical legal studies and legal realism raise[ d] is the 
difficulty about explaining •.. how it is that you can follow rules, the rules about following 
rules, and so on. And that is a mug's game ••. we do not need to play."). Indeed, some 
postmodern authors seem to admit as much. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: 
An Introduction to Its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 505, 516 (1986); 
Sanford Levinson, Writing About Realism, 1985 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 899, 908 (reviewing 
ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCI.Asr AS REFORMER: JEROME.FRANK'S IMPACT ON 
AMERICAN LAw (1985)). 
The fact that Minda understands these and other intellectual trends as distinct and separa­
ble ~akes up a major component of this Notice's criticism of the book. As discussed below, 
see infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text, ifpostmodemism is anything, it is a rejection of 
attempts to categorize and compartmentalize the world. To be sure, Minda is hardly the only 
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Minda also sees the beginnings of postmodernism surfacing 
in the civil rights case law of the Warren Court. In particular, in 
Brown v. Board of Education,21 the Court rejected the then­
dominant "separate-but-equal" regime because "traditional legal 
analysis had failed to recognize that law contributes to the construc­
tion of social reality" (p. 64) - that is, that "separate" seemed 
"equal" at least in part because the law said it was (p. 74). 
The recognition of the reciprocity of law and society precipi­
tated the changes in scholarly thought that have led to current juris­
prudence. Young thinkers influenced by this recognition "rejected 
the notion that law was distinct from political and moral philoso­
phy; [they] also rejected the idea that law could be rendered coher­
ent by a comprehensive legal theory" (p. 77). This new brand of 
culturally influenced scholarship soon spurred the growth of five 
distinct scholarly movements - the "law-and" movements and the 
critical theory schools - that remain with us today. These recent 
movements are dealt with in the second part of Minda's book. 
B. The Five Schools 
Minda explains "that ... five jurisprudential movements of the 
1980s have . . . come to reflect the emergence of a new skeptical 
aesthetic, mood, or intellectual condition in American jurispruden­
tial studies, which many have identified as postmodern" (p. 2). 
These five schools, each of which is treated separately in its own 
chapter, are (i) law and economics (chapter 5), (ii) critical legal 
studies (chapter 6), (iii) feminist legal theory (chapter 7), (iv) law 
and literature (chapter 8), and (v) critical race theory (chapter 9). 
Minda explains that each school has gone through "generations" 
(p. 94). In each case, initial proponents of the school, while innova­
tive, retained too much of the modernist baggage that they sought 
to discard. Later scholars purported to avoid their predecessors' 
mistakes. For example, "first-generation" law-and-economics 
scholars practiced a sort of orthodoxy that held that "law was eco­
nomics, and economics was a neutral, apolitical science of 'reason'" 
(pp. 94-95). This did not differ in essence from Langdell's optimis­
tic view that rigid rules underlie the law. By the mid-1980s, how­
ever, the strict first-generation orthodoxy, embraced primarily by 
"the 'hardliners' of the Chicago School" (p. 94), had begun to give 
way. "Second-generation" law-and-economics scholars came into 
their own, rejecting the rigidity of their forebears and accepting that 
values other than allocational efficiency can be used legitimately to 
drive legal choices (pp. 95-101). 
person who sees these trends as discrete entities. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 424. 
The point, however, is that Minda is a postmodernist who sees them that way. 
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Furthermore, Minda apparently believes that the same 
postmodern forces that brought about the five schools themselves 
have caused them, in recent years, to deteriorate. He says that "[i]t 
is only now becoming clear that the new legal discourses of the 'law 
and' movements of the late 1970s and 1980s have themselves 
become transformed by a general disenchanted condition that has 
affected contemporary legal scholarship -postmodernism" (p. 79). 
Thus, the five schools "deepened and advanced a process of crisis 
and transition in modem jurisprudence" (p. 189). Apparently, this 
transition has caused many legal scholars to reject modernism 
entirely and enter fully into the phase of postmodernism. 
C. The Postmodern Turn 
It is not entirely clear what this turn to the postmodern means 
for legal scholarship.22 In fact, the term postmodern itself has 
proved notoriously difficult to define.23 As mentioned above,24 
postmodernism is generally defined by reference - it is that which 
is not modern.25 This approach is significantly complicated by the 
fact that no one really agrees on what modern means26 - the most 
precise definitions are to the effect that modernism is an extension 
of "the Enlightenment Project,"27 and generally is an adoption of 
22. What is clear, however, is that the postmodern tum has not been received very 
warmly in many quarters. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 422-28; Owen M. Fiss, The 
Death ofthe Law?, 72 CORNELL L. Rav. 1 (1986); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in 
Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. Rav. 871 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. Rav. 714 (1994); 
Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction of 
Legal Theory, 72 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1993); John R. Searle, The World Turned Upside 
Down, N.Y. Rav. BooKS, Oct 27, 1983, at 74, 78 n.3 (book review) ("One [philosopher] 
characterized Derrida [a major influence in American postmodernism] as 'the sort of philos­
opher who gives bullshit a bad name.' We cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that this 
may be an expression of praise in the [postmodern] vocabulary."). 
For the reaction typical of many scholars when confronted with postmodern work, see 
David Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1656 (1986). Upon first reading Roll Over 
Beethoven by Duncan Kennedy and Peter Gabel, Luban thought "it was a pile of crap" that 
"sounds like a pair of old acid-heads chewing over a passage in Sartre." Id. at 1671-72 (dis­
cussing Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984)). 
23. Minda himself notes that "[t]o identify postmodernism with a set of propositions, 
beliefs, or 'postmodern narrative' would be too essentialist, too modernist, to be 
postmodern." P. 4. 
24. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
25. Minda does this at one point. See p. 5 (claiming that we understand postmodern 
jurisprudence by "explor[ing] what came before postmodernism, that is, modernism"). 
26. See KOLAKOWSKI, supra note 10; Jamieson, supra note 9, at 577. 
27. See, e.g., pp. 58-59; Andrew M. Jacobs, God Save This Postmodern Court: The Death 
ofNecessity and the Transformation of the Supreme Court's Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U. CIN. 
L. Rav. 1119, 1144 (1995); Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. 
REv. 254, 262 (1992) ("Modernism is the form of thought identified with the spirit of the 
Enlightenment ...•"). 
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foundationalist knowledge and theoretical approaches.28 Perhaps 
the best that can be done is to identify salient characteristics of 
postmodern scholarship. Postmodernism apparently contemplates 
both a set of approaches - such as deconstructive social criticism, 
antifoundationalist epistemology, and rejection of traditional meta­
physics29 - and a collection of attitudes - such as distrust of social 
categories like race or sex and a subjective view of personal iden­
tity.3o One commentator attempted to capture the meaning of 
postmodernism by identifying four "interrelated concepts" with 
which it is associated. They are: 
(1) The self is not, and cannot be, an autonomous, self-generating 
entity; it is purely a social, cultural, historical, and linguistic creation. 
(2) There are no foundational principles from which other assertions 
can be derived; hence, certainty as the result of either empirical verifi­
cation or deductive reasoning is impossible. (3) There can be no such 
thing as knowledge of reality; what we think is knowledge is always 
belief and can apply only to the context within which it is asserted. 
(4) Because language is socially and culturally constitµted it is inher­
ently incapable of representing or corresponding to reality; hence all 
propositions and all interpretations, even texts, are themselves social 
constructions.31 
It is unclear what Minda means by "postmodernism." As is per­
haps evident from the discussion of the five schools above, he uses 
it to describe different phenomena - for example, both the emer­
gence of the schools themselves (p. 2), and the current sense of 
ennui and disaffection that has begun to spell their downfall (p. 79), 
are postmodern in nature.32 His most general definition of the term 
28. See STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELINER, PoSThfODERN THEORY: CRmCAL 
INTERROGATIONS 206-07, 230-31 (1991) (asserting that postmodernism rejects foundational­
ism); Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and 
Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REv. 353, 353-54 (1995) ("Legal modernism is ••• 
motivated largely by the lawyer's romance, faith, and yes, obsession with the central idea that 
it is possible to uncover and explain the essential truths of the world by employing the correct 
methodology, narrative technique, or mindset"); Patterson, supra note 27, at 263 (asserting 
that modernism is characterized by "epistemological foundationalism"). 
29. See Feldman, supra note 13, at 663-64 (claiming that while deconstruction and philo­
sophical hermeneutics do not reject all metaphysics, they do reject Cartesian subject-object 
metaphysics); Moore, supra note 22, at 892-957 (arguing that a wide range of philosophers 
associated with postmodernism have rejected traditional metaphysics and epistemology). 
30. See Jamieson, supra note 9, at 583-84. 
31. Schanck, supra note 11, at 2508-09. Minda largely rejects Schanck's formulation 
because "any attempt to locate the core concepts or essence of postmodernism falls prey to 
modernism." P. 190. That is, to attempt to identify the principles driving postmodernism 
would be to create a narrative, which is a modernist, and not a postmodernist, pursuit. 
Minda's argument is exceptionally ironic. It may be right, but it also identifies what 
seems to be exactly the weakness in Minda's own book. See infra section II.B. 
32. Minda devotes an entire chapter to "postmodern jurisprudence," giving it a treatment 
not unlike his treatment of the five schools. Thus, he seems to see postmodernism as both a 
set of forces guiding scholarship and a brand, or at least a loosely discernable class, of schol­
arship itself. 
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is that it is "a skeptical attitude or aesthetic that 'distrusts all 
attempts to create large-scale, totalizing theories in order to explain 
social phenomena.' "33 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH THEORIES 
Both as a historical account and as an argument about jurispru­
dence, Postmodern Legal Movements presents certain problems. 
First, as will be discussed in section II.A, the book's historical over­
view and synthesis of modernist legal thought seem too categorical. 
The discussion moves at rapid-fire speed through all of twentieth­
century jurisprudence, and in the process puts forth an unduly rigid 
account. Th.is occurs, it seems, both because the pace is very fast 
and because Minda tends to take ideological sides.34 In the process, 
his historical analysis reveals a second and rather ironic problem: 
the book is subject to its author's very criticisms of modernism. 
This second problem will be addressed in section II.B. 
A. Difficulties of Method 
First of all, Minda's historical account often seems unduly 
wooden. Th.is is an important problem in intellectual history; as 
Neil Duxbury writes, "the ways in which jurisprudential concepts 
and themes are interpreted and applied influence the manner in 
which ideas about law come to be underst<?od historically" and 
therefore "intellectual historians ought to be wary of using words 
like birth and death."35 
Postmodern Legal Movements has a powerful tendency to cate­
gorize and reify intellectual movements. Ironically, Minda suggests 
that even postmodern legal thought itself can be lumped into two 
33. P. 224 (quoting CoSTAS DOUZINAS, POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE at x (1991)). 
34. In particular, Minda berates the modernist status quo and predicts its downfall. Pp. 
247-57; see also pp. 21-22 (claiming that legal modernism is based on a "paradoxical mind­
set" defined by "a set of conflicting and paradoxical abstract propositions about the nature of 
the legal system and the power of legal actors within the system"; thus, "[t]he dilemmas of 
modem legal theory have never been resolved"); pp. 64-65 ("[T]raditional legal analysis ha[s] 
failed to recognize that law contributes to the construction of social reality" because it is 
"naive."); p. 75 ("[T]he old modes of representation" of modem jurisprudence "[are] no 
longer credible."); p. 79 (arguing that modernist scholars fail in their attempt to "ground their 
particular rights in a stable meta-ethics, moral epistemology, or interpretive practice"); Gary 
Minda, The Dilemmas of Property and Sovereignty in the Postmodern Era: The Regulatory 
Takings Problem, 62 U. CoLO. L. REv. 599, 603 (1991) ("Postmodernist scholarship typically 
proceeds by uncovering the contradictions, paradoxes, and puzzles of American law."); Gary 
Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements ofthe 1980s, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 599, 660 (1989) ("[T]he 
prevailing visions of the 1950s and 1960s no longer adequately explain or justify the opera­
tion and conflict of everyday social life occurring in the marketplace, the workplace, and the 
family."); Minda, supra note 28, at 353 (describing legal modernism as an "obsession with ... 
essential truths"). 
35. DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 1, 6. 
1936 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:1927 
"sides" or "schools": the neopragmatists and the ironists.36 It is 
unclear how this abstract classification of postmodern movements 
can be reconciled with Minda's general claim that the 
postmodernist "distrusts all attempts to create large-scale, totalizing 
theories" (p. 224).37 
Furthermore, much of the historical discussion is one-sided and 
argumentative. For example, Chapter Six, devoted to the critical 
legal studies movement, is surprisingly polemical and defensive. 
The previous five chapters (setting out "modernism") are largely 
impartial, but when Minda reaches CLS, the book suddenly shifts in 
tone to read virtually like an appellate brief. CLS, says Minda, is 
"liberating" (p. 126), it is "important" because it "reveal[ s] ... the 
privileging process of legal hierarchies,"38 and it is even "amazing" 
(p. 124). CLS is not "irresponsible" or even "irrelevant" or 
"banal," but rather it is of "continuing influence," for it presents a 
"critique [that] remains, to this day, unanswered" (pp. 123-27). 
This tendency towards encapsulation and rhetoric is if anything 
more pronounced in Minda's characterizations of the overall 
Gestalten of various points in intellectual history. For example, in 
his sweeping, almost breathless summary of "Jurisprudence at 
Century's End" (pp. 247-57), Minda argues that postmodernism is 
36. See chapter 12. In brief, the neopragmatists hold that there are no "essences" or 
inherent truths to be discovered by humans, and thus that "right" and "wrong" are at best 
mere beliefs that are contingent on historical circumstance. See, e.g., RICHARD RoRTY, 
CoNTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SounARITY 189-98 {1989); cf. Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other 
Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569, 1569 (1990) 
(describing pragmatism as "freedom from theory-guilt"). Thus, neopragmatist legal scholars 
may believe that the law "should" take a given tum in a given case but that the normative 
"should" does not flow from any extra-human principle or value. These scholars are 
postmodernists, in Minda's view, because their "real interest is not in truth at all but in belief 
justified by social need." P. 235 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 464 (1990)). 
The ironists take a different view, rejecting the neopragmatic "middle ground" of norma­
tive answers based on historically contingent beliefs. The ironist viewpoint is "ironic" 
because, while legal ironists seek to "decenter and displace modernist claims of a universalist 
method" of legal thought, they recognize that they are themselves hopelessly trapped within 
modernist ways of thinking and arguing and thus that in their criticisms of modernism they 
are doomed to repeat its paradoxes and inconsistencies. P. 237. For an explication of this 
predicament and a defense of the postmodernist who operates within it, see Pierre Schlag, 
Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REv. 167, 174 n.18 (1990) ("Postmodemists are 
quite unlikely to take the demonstration of a paradox in their text as in and of itself evidence 
of weakness or flaw•••• [They view the] naive rationalist conceptions of coherence, consis­
tency, elegance, etc., [as] largely the product of disciplinary hubris and the inertia of aca­
demic bureaucracy."). It is this recognition that even postmodernist scholars cannot escape 
modernism that has led the ironists to reject even neopragmatism. Pp. 236-37. 
37. See discussion infra section 11.B. 
38. Pp. 116-17. That is, CLS, by way of "deconstruction," demonstrates how the selection 
of one value by a legal rule arbitrarily rejects all other possible values; it "privileges" the 
chosen value. Adherents to the writings of Jacques Derrida, which have influenced CLS and 
postmodernism heavily, distrust this privileging process because the "hierarchies of the 'text' 
[that is, socially constructed narratives], which are frequently taken for granted, are essen­
tially impossible to use for justifying foundational claims of knowledge." P. 118. 
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gradually overcoming modernism, and, apparently, will eventually 
win. He says that "[t]he older modes of defining, appropriating, 
and evaluating the objects of artistic, philosophical, literary, and 
social sciences [are] no longer credible because the boundary 
between subjects and their objects [has] dissolved" (p. 249). There­
fore, it seems natural to Minda that "[t]here is a rising sentiment in 
the legal academy that modem legal theory has failed to sustain the 
modernists' hopes for social progress" (p. 249). 
Strictly on the basis of numbers, however, it would seem that 
new "modernist" works of legal theory by far outnumber new 
works of arguably postmodern criticism, and while there may have 
been a surge of postmodern scholarship in recent years, there has 
also been a surge of scholarship bitterly criticizing it.39 Thus, it 
seems that Minda is unduly hasty in his announcement that 
postmodernism will overcome modernism. Oddly enough, he 
claims in this same passage that "[c]ynicism comes with the realiza­
tion that each succeeding generation of modem legal scholars has 
merely recycled the work of the previous generation . . . without 
ever achieving a successful ... theory that can withstand the criti­
cism of the next generation" (pp. 249-50). But it could as easily be 
said of legal postmodernism that it is in substance just a rehash of 
other skeptical movements that have already come and gone ­
notably the more radically skeptical works of the legal realist move­
ment.40 If so, then Minda's claim that postmodernism is "hastening 
the death" of modernist scholarship (p. 257) is surely exaggerated. 
39. See sources cited supra note 22. 
40. For example, Felix Cohen argued that law and politics are interwoven, because the 
social forces that inform our ideals are the same forces that construct our law. See Felix S. 
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 809, 810­
12 (1935). As early as 1924, Joseph Hutcheson, himself a federal judge, claimed that legal 
decisions were nothing more than "hunches," seasoned, perhaps, by experience, but nonethe­
less not driven by external principles, suggesting an extreme sort of indeterminacy, and ­
although Hutcheson did not say as much - opening the door to wholly politically driven 
judicial decisions. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function ofthe 
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CoRNELL L.Q. 274, 277-78 (1924). 
It is not immediately clear how postmodernism differs significantly from radical realism; 
both perspectives seem to share the same views as to law's indeterminacy and its inseparabil­
ity from politics. Minda admits that the critical legal studies movement grew from realism, p. 
110, and that CLS as a movement grew from postmodernism, p. 116 (noting that late 1980s 
CLS papers began to apply postmodern techniques). But perhaps the relationship could bet­
ter be stated as "reiterates." See generally supra note 16. 
Furthermore, one might ask: What if there is no interesting difference between any of the 
skeptical schools, in that their basic claim - doubt - does not really differ across different 
schools? If so, then postmodernism can hardly be thought to be the revolution that Minda 
makes it out to be. Rather, it is merely the most recent resurgence of the skepticism that has 
always been with us. In this vein, Brian Simpson points out that there have always been 
skeptics or "iconoclasts" in law, and, although their methodology and jargon may change 
over time, their central thrust - simple doubt - has remained constant. See Simpson, supra 
note 20, at 830-31. Simpson identifies written evidence of such legal iconoclasm from as early 
as 1345. See id. at 828; see also Christopher L. Sagers, Waiting for Brother Thomas, 15-22 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) {developing a similar point). Not everyone 
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In any event, the point here is not whether modernism or 
postmodernism is the victor, but only that Minda for whatever rea­
son has chosen to tell an ideologically tilted story that is not so clear 
as he makes it out to be. 
B. The Modernism Irony 
These difficulties in Minda's historical presentation are ironic 
ones to discover in a work about postmodernism, and they point to 
the basic irony underlying the book: they are problems associated 
with modernism, if anything, and they occur because the book itself 
is a modernist project. 
As discussed above,41 postmodernism has proved notoriously 
difficult to define. If postmodernism for legal scholars has meant 
anything at all, however, it has been a rejection of the idea that 
truth can be summed up in "a theory or a concept," because in fact 
there is no "'real' world or legal system 'out there'."42 Morton 
Horwitz - himself both a CLS adherent and a noted legal historian 
- writes that "[t]he subversive assault [on] traditional theories of 
law" has caused legal thinkers to "focus[ ] upon the classification 
and categorization of legal phenomena and [to] conclude[] that ... 
[b]ecause there are no 'natural classes,' the process of categoriza­
tion and classification is a social creation, not an act reflecting some 
prior organization of nature."43 It is thus often said that 
postmodernists deeply distrust "metanarratives" - that is, broad, 
generalized explanations of phenomena.44 As Minda explains: 
agrees, of course; for the view that realism, CLS, and postmodernism are more than trivially 
distinct, see DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 422-28. 
41. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
42. P. 224 (quoting DouZINAS, supra note 33, at x); see also DAVID HARVEY, THB 
CoNDrnoN OF PoSTMoDERNITY 44 (1989) ("[T]he most startling fact about postmodernism 
[is] its total acceptance of ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic ••.• 
Postmodernism swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and chaotic currents of change as if 
that is all there is."); Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal 
Scholarship and Judicial Practice (with an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in 
Habeas Corpus Cases), 88 Nw. L. REv. 1046, 1080 (1994) ("Postmodernism is anti­
foundationalist and anti-essentialist • • • . [I]t accentuates that meaning always remains 
ungrounded[, and) ungrounded meanings are always unstable and shifting: meaning cannot 
be reduced to a static core or essence."); Jacobs, supra note 27, at 1144 (arguing that 
"postmodernism attacks the foundationalism of modernism, or the modernist belief that 
knowledge rests on some ultimately verifiable truths"); Schanck, supra note 11, at 2508 
(identifying as major tenets of postmodernism that "there are no foundational principles 
from which other assertions can be derived" and that "[t]here can be no such thing as knowl­
edge of reality"); Allan C. Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (Is There Politics After 
Postmodernism?), 89 MICH. L REv. 1549, 1550 (1991) (reviewing MARTHA MINow, MAKING 
AIL THE DIFFERENCE (1990)) (describing postmodernists as the "obituarists of 'fruth and 
Grand Theory"). 
43. Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without 
Fundamentalism, 107 HARv. L. REv. 30, 33 (1993). 
44. Jean-Fran~is Lyotard coined the term metana"ative as a means to define 
postmodernism itself, which, he said, is an attitude of "incredulity towards metanarrative." 
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[p]ostmodernism .... is an aesthetic practice and condition that is 
opposed to "Grand Theory," structural patterns, or foundational 
knowledges. Postmodern legal critics employ local, small-scale prob­
lem-solving strategies to raise new questions about the relation of law, 
politics and culture .... 
. . . They seem to be united in their resistance to the sort of con­
ceptual theorization and system building routinely practiced by legal 
academics and analytical philosophers. [p. 3]. 
The book thus argues at length that contemporary scholars have 
begun to lose faith in their ability to abstract categorizations from 
their observations and research. In Minda's terms, members of the 
American legal academy currently face a transition to a new era of 
scholarship in which "foundational truths, transcendental values, 
and neutral conceptions" are replaced with "more pluralistic, con­
textual, and nonessential explanation[s]" {p. 2). 
Given this outlook, one might expect a postmodernist's recount­
ing of intellectual history to be wary of rigid conclusions and cate­
gorizations. Quite to the contrary, however, Minda seems to 
believe that legal philosophies can be neatly sized up and summa­
rized. Indeed, from the beginning he states as his purpose "to pres­
ent a general overview of the state of law and jurisprudence at 
twentieth century's end" (p. xi). To do this, he "tr[ies to] capture 
the general jurisprudential climate by reviewing some of the 'great' 
books and law review articles on jurisprudence and legal theory" 
(p. xii). In other words, the jurisprudential zeitgeist can quite sim­
ply be crammed into "conceptual theorization and system building" 
b~cause, apparently, there really is a "real" world "out there." The 
irony, then, is that Minda has written a book of the sort that he says 
should not be written. It does not "employ local, small-scale prob­
lem-solving strategies to raise new questions about the relation of 
law, politics and culture." It is simply another straightforward his­
JEAN-FRANc;:oIS LYOTARD, THE PosrMODERN CoNDmoN: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE at 
xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., University of Minn. Press 1984) (1979). 
Lyotard defined "metanarratives" as "grand narratives," such as "the dialectics of spirit, the 
hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the crea­
tion of wealth." Id.; see also David E. Cooper, Modem European Philosophy, in THE 
BLACKWELL CoMPANION TO PmLosoPHY 7f.J2, 714 (Nicholas Bunnin & E.P. Tsui-James eds., 
1996) (defining "metanarratives" as "the grand attempts, from the Enlightenment until very 
recently, to 'legitimate' various 'discourses' both scientific and moral"). Minda defines "legal 
metanarratives" as "rhetorical modes of conceptual and normative legal thought that pre­
sume the existence of a correct answer for every legal problem." P. 103 n.96. This seems 
unduly limited, given Lyotard's broad use of the term, and, in any event, appears indistin­
guishable from Minda's use of "formalism." Perhaps a better use of "legal metanarrative" 
would be "any attempt by legal scholars at generalized system building" or "legal theoriza­
tion." For useful explanations of the influence of Lyotard and other continental philosophers 
on American jurisprudence, see Feldman, supra note 13; Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of 
Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REv. 166 (1996). 
1940 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 95:1927 
tory of twentieth-century jurisprudence, several examples of which 
already exist.45 
Minda's approach is more than simply ironic. A more careful 
analysis might have led Minda to face many important problems 
that instead are ignored here. That is, if Minda had engaged in crit­
icism of postmodern criticism itself, he might have reached the 
many perplexing difficulties of postmodernism that are, to be frank, 
more interesting than the literature summary that makes up the 
bulk of this book. 
For example, the thoughtful postmodernist might ask: How can 
one both deny the metaphysical reality of social values and engage 
in social criticism? That is, if all values are socially constructed, his­
torically contingent, and relative, how can we ever say that any pol­
icy choice is "good" or "bad"? Opponents of postmodernism have 
raised this complaint often.46 Several scholars have attempted to 
face this exceptionally difficult problem,47 but it goes virtually 
unmentioned in this book.48 Postmodernism raises many such para­
doxes, all of which seem central to Minda's project. Yet, while he 
acknowledges some of them in passing, the vast bulk of the book 
ignores them in favor of lengthy literature review and synthesis. 
A likely response to these criticisms would be that postmodem­
ism, by its nature, is not troubled by contradiction or paradox. 
Postmodernism recognizes and embraces the predicaments of mod­
ernist language and argumentative techniques because the 
45. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 11; GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 
(1977); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMoN LAW TRADmoN (1960). 
46. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 422-23; Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, 
and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & SoCY. REv. 697 (1992); Nussbaum, supra note 22 
(arguing that the techniques of Jacques Derrida, which have been highly influential amongst 
postmodern legal philosophers, are nihilistic and morally relativistic); Patterson, supra note 
22, at 21 (arguing that postmodern "interpretivism" leads to an "infinite regress" of solipsism 
and moral relativism, because every interpretation is subject to another interpretation). 
47. For example, Stephen Feldman suggests that postmodernism does not lead to moral 
relativism or an infinite regression of interpretations because the interpretive or critical act 
that, in his view, is central to postmodernism is itself ontological That is, the act creates 
meaning and thus allows us to act in the world. See Feldman, supra note 13, at 671-90 (argu­
ing that postmodernism does not reject metaphysics but merely revolutionizes it; therefore, 
we can still meaningfully criticize); Feldman, supra note 44, at 185-92. J.M. Balkin, in con­
trast, seems to think that there are "transcendental" values on which humans can draw, 
including, most importantly, "justice." For him, postmodernists evade nihilism by searching 
for those values that flow from "the wellsprings of the human soul." J.M. Balkin, 
Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131, 1139 (1994), 
Similarly, Joseph Singer has argued that law can be reconstructed in the wake of nihilistic 
critique by an essentially pragmatic process of "moral decisions" that are no different than 
our "everyday moral decisions." Singer sets out a short list of rudimentary values he believes 
should be discovered through this process, including the prevention of cruelty and misery. 
See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE 
w. 1, 62, 67-70 (1984). 
48. The problem is briefly raised late in the book, but receives no more attention than a 
three-page summary of the scholarship of Pierre Schlag. See pp. 243-46. 
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postmodernist, while aware of these problems, does not believe that 
sch.olars "should, will, or [are] even capable of demonstrably stand­
ing outside of [the modernist] system."49 The postmodernist will 
thus claim that it is no argument to point out the paradoxes or 
inconsistencies in Postmodern Legal Movements, because they are 
merely the result of the paradoxes or inconsistencies of modernist 
thought. Furthermore, postmodernists might argue that to attempt 
to avoid the paradoxes of postmodern scholarship would be not 
only impossible, but limiting; to "claim to stand outside of this sys­
tem, and thus claim to avoid paradox" would be to "beg the exceed­
ingly interesting question of where the boundaries (if any) of this 
system of ... legal thought are located and whether this system can 
even be adequately conceptualized as having a determinate or 
localizable inside and outside."so 
The point, however, is not that Minda has not solved these 
problems, but rather that in this book he does not even face them. 
Furthermore, the problem is not simply lack of completeness - it is 
not as if this were a book on property law that fails to say enough 
about zoning. On the contrary, the book fails to address issues cen­
tral to Minda's picture of postmodernism overtaking the legal acad­
emy, and it fails to address the awkward irony of heralding such a 
paradigm shift in a book that does not itself seem to be 
postmodern. Thus, Postmodern Legal Movements is like a book 
about property law that fails to say anything about property law. 
Finally, these various problems raise a much more basic ques­
tion or paradox of postmodern jurisprudence, and it is again one 
that remains completely unmentioned in Postmodern Legal 
Movements. The question is this: Can one be a postmodern legal 
scholar? That is, can one share in the doubts and criticisms 
postmodernists share, and yet also engage in the sort of discourse 
on which legal scholarship traditionally has been based - which, 
according to the postmodernist, appears to be useless? At the very 
least, can one do so without being disingenuous? If not, then why 
do it?51 
Some postmodernists have suggested that there is no reason to. 
Robert Williams, for example, believes that 
49. Schlag, supra note 36, at 174 n.18. 
50. Id. 
51. As Louis Menand wrote, "[I]f one is a professor at Harvard or Stanford or 
Georgetown law school, one enjoys a rather desirable set of occupational conditions to have 
to worry about. It's nice to have available a style of radical politics that doesn't require 
giving any of them up." This outlook commends itself to "schemes for professors and jani­
tors to share in communal decision-making at law schools, as a substitute for asking why ­
given their analysis - law schools ... should exist." Louis Menand, Radicalism for Yuppies, 
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 17, 1986, at 20, 23. 
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the model of the law professor that I had bought into during the early, 
cursed, deformative years of my academic career was . . . a nine­
teenth-century relic[; it] was constructed out of a Victorian-era law 
professor's wet dream [and was] warped and twisted and ill-suited to 
the demands of a postmodern multicultural world ..• .sz 
Williams therefore urges postmodern scholars to engage in 
postmodern practice - in his case, "Critical Race Practice." That 
is, the postmodernist should apply theory to practice by helping 
others, or serving the needs of the community, or whatever; the 
point is that postmodernism counsels one to discard traditional 
modes of argument in favor of more appropriate action. This is so, 
says Williams to the postmodernist, because it does not advance the 
postmodern project to "deconstruct the world with your word 
processor."53 
The postmodernist might answer that, while it does seem to be 
inconsistent to be a postmodern legal scholar, there is nothing 
inherently wrong with inconsistency, and perhaps that it is impossi­
ble for humans not to be inconsistent. That would seem to be an 
implication of much of postmodern thought. Perhaps there are 
other compelling answers. But, again, the weakness of Postmodern 
Legal Movements is not its failure to resolve these perplexing ques­
tions, but its inexplicable failure even to address them. It could be 
a more interesting and provocative book if it did. 
CONCLUSION 
The project underlying Postmodern Legal Movements is ambi­
tious and interesting, and to a certain extent the book is a successful 
effort. It is a useful and reasonably accessible primer on the basic 
concepts of American jurisprudence, and it will serve as a good 
introduction to students or lawyers who have little background in 
legal philosophy. 
Beyond that, however, the book is problematic both on a super­
ficial and on a deeper level, and for more advanced readers it will 
prove frustrating. On the surface, the book lacks caution in its his­
torical rendering. Conclusions follow too quickly from scanty evi­
dence. Minda often makes fairly sweeping claims about whole 
movements or schools in the face of plentiful evidence in favor of 
other interpretations. More important, the book is by its nature at 
odds with its own premises. The implicit claim of Postmodern Legal 
Movements seems to be that one can identify movements in legal 
thought, even though the postmodernist must apparently believe 
that whenever we arrive at such a claim - such a metanarrative ­
52. Robert A. Wtlliams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race Practice, 95 MICH. L. 
REv. 741, 756-67 (1997). 
53. Id. at 757. 
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we are constructing the world, not merely describing it. One con­
struction is not more useful than any other, at least not for any rea­
son that Minda provides. A whole series of issues arise from this 
conflict that are never addressed in the book but that would be very 
interesting and are important in defending Minda's thesis. Thus, 
Postmodern Legal Movements seems to raise more problems than it 
solves, whether as a defense or even a basic description of 
postmodernism. 
-Christopher L. Sagers 
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